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Using data from the 2013 European Company Survey, this paper operationalizes the 
representation gap as the desire for greater employee involvement in decision making 
expressed by the representative of the leading employee representative body at the 
workplace. According to this measure there is evidence of a substantial shortfall in employee 
involvement in the EU, not dissimilar to that reported for the United States. The paper 
proceeds to investigate how the size of this representation gap varies by type of 
representative structure, information provided by management, the resource base available 
to the representatives, and the status of trust between the parties. Perceived deficits are found 
to be smaller where workplace representation is via works councils rather than union bodies. 
Furthermore, the desire for greater involvement is reduced where information provided the 
employee representative on a range of establishment issues is judged satisfactory. A higher 
frequency of meetings with management also appears to mitigate the expressed desire for 
greater involvement. Each of these results is robust to estimation over different country 
clusters. However, unlike the other arguments, the conclusion that shortfalls in employee 
involvement representation are smaller under works councils than union bodies are nullified 
where trust in management is lacking.  
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1.  Introduction 
The widespread decline in unionism has prompted fears of a deficiency in worker voice. 
Although the alarm bell has been sounded on a number of occasions since the 1980s, the 
case was first formally articulated for the United States. In charting the gap between the type 
and extent of workplace representation wanted by workers and that currently obtaining, 
Freeman and Rogers (1999) found that a very large majority of American workers – in the 
range 85 to 90 percent – desired greater collective voice at the workplace than they currently 
enjoyed and that, overall, some 44 percent of workers favored union representation.1 
Updated research for the United States seemed to suggest that workers wanted as much or 
more of a voice in their workplace, and that more than before (now a majority) would vote 
for unions (Freeman and Rogers, 2006; Freeman, 2007). As we shall see, the most recent 
U.S. research essentially confirms these results while raising new issues (Kochan et al., 
2019).  
Evidence of a representation gap, albeit smaller in magnitude, has also been found 
for Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Freeman, Boxall, 
and Haynes, 2007).  For the U.K. in particular, surveys of worker perceptions of the 
problems they confront at the workplace and the effectiveness of unions (and management) 
in dealing with these problems offer a more nuanced view.2 Thus, as reported by Bryson 
and Freeman (2007), although there is every indication that British workers value unions as 
sources of wage increases and protection against unfair treatment by management, a 
majority of them envisage no major workplace problems that would cause them to join 
unions. Bryson and Freeman further observe that workers want cooperation rather than 
confrontation, preferring bodies that cooperate with management to improve conditions than 
a more defensive organization offering protection against unfair treatment by management. 
Admittedly there is a certain tension in all of this because cooperation as an equal partner 
requires power that can be used in a destructive manner and harm industrial relations, while 
the adoption by management of a cooperative stance may find that unions interpret this as a 
sign of weakness to be exploited (see below).  
And what of the expression of worker voice in the European Union, the subject of 
the present treatment? First of all, as a matter of principle, the European Union has long 
sought to promote worker participation in member states based on the twin notions of 
industrial democracy and economic competitiveness.3 Indeed, Directive 2002 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2002 sets down a general framework for 
informing and consulting workers at national level, and not only through union bodies 
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(Official Journal, 2002). The Directive provides for a procedure of general, permanent, and 
effective information and consultation of workers in respect of recent and probable 
development in an undertaking’s activities and economic situation, the structure of 
employment and decisions that might lead to material changes in work organization and 
contractual relations.4 As a practical matter, and reflecting the fact that worker participation 
rights at establishment/undertaking level vary considerably between the nations of the EU, 
the legislation allows member states considerable freedom of maneuver in policy design. 
We are unaware of any planned alignment/simplification of these practices or consolidation 
of the EU directives on the information and consultation of workers in the wake of the 
Commission’s subsequent consultation with the social partners on the issue (European 
Commission, 2015).5 Second of all, however, apart from interesting descriptive information 
on the types of workplace representation (Fulton, 2015) and the facts of union decline inter 
al. charted in the ICTWSS,6  there has been a near void concerning the perceived adequacy 
of employee voice in the EU. That is, there has been no examination of EU workplace 
representation directly analogous to the individual worker, largely union-oriented worker 
surveys noted earlier.  
Fortunately, this void has been partly filled by information contained in the most 
recent European Company Survey (ECS). Specifically, the Employee Representative (ER) 
Questionnaire of the 2013 ECS solicits the views of the designated representative of the 
leading employee representation body at the workplace as to the involvement of employees 
and their representatives in the organization of work. The survey questions pertain to the 
characteristics of the ER body – works councils or kindred agencies on the one hand and 
union bodies on the other – including the manner of its functioning, the quality of the 
information provided it by management, its degree of involvement in decision making (as 
well as trust in management), and the work climate. 
In the present paper we present the first formal analysis of the extent of the worker 
representation gap at the EU establishment.7 We operationalize the representation gap as the 
expressed desire for greater involvement in decision making on the part of the representative 
of the leading employee representative body. A distinction is therefore drawn between 
prevalent work councils and prevalent union entities. It is predicted on the basis of theory 
and practice that perceived deficits will be smaller under works councils than union bodies. 
It is also anticipated that the desire for greater involvement will be reduced where the 
amount of information provided to the worker representation agency across a range of 
employment issues is judged satisfactory by the worker side. This may especially be the 
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case in circumstances of major human resource decisions where the worker representation 
body is asked to give its views or be involved in joint decision making with management.  
Certain aspects of the entity’s resource base, such as a higher frequency of meetings with 
management, should also mitigate the desire for greater involvement. A penultimate issue 
is the vexed question of the trust place in management by the worker side, and the effect 
such confidence or otherwise has on other expected relationships. The robustness of these 
results to reestimation over different clusters of countries is another hallmark of our 
approach.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. A theoretical backdrop to worker representation 
precedes a terse audit of the most recent ECS empirical literature on workplace 
representation to contextualize our analysis. There follows a description of the principal 
dataset used in this inquiry. Our modeling strategy is next addressed to establish the 
framework for the main hypotheses being tested. Our detailed findings are next reported. A 
discussion concludes.  
 
2.  Literature 
Theoretical considerations  
Prior to examining the relevant aspects of the empirical literature, we consider the economic 
factors that might be expected to underpin employee participation or representation gaps. 
Relatedly, what guidance does theory offer as to the relative efficacy of the two formal 
channels of workplace representation identified in the ECS (namely works councils and 
union bodies)? And, finally, what might be the contribution of other factors in the form of 
trust or the quality of the industrial relations climate to the effectiveness of workplace 
representation?  
 Market failure might be expected to produce suboptimal levels of employee 
representation and involvement. The imperfections in question would include externalities, 
prisoner’s dilemma, adverse selection, opportunism, and principal-agent-problems 
(Kaufman, 2000).8 For their part, externalities are spillover (i.e. third-party) benefits or costs 
not properly accounted for by decision makers. When such externalities are present (at the 
margin), social benefits or costs diverge from private benefits or costs. A case in point would 
be the public goods aspects of shared working conditions, resulting in the underprovision of 
valued benefits as workers underinvest in making their preferences known. Another 
example might be joint safety committees; to the extent that these yield benefits to third 
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parties in reduced health care costs, employers will underinvest in them. Indeed, if the 
choice of work organization at one firm – for example, a participatory workplace with a 
compressed wage structure – benefits other employers by enabling them to hire its stars at 
a discount, the market may be said to be systematically biased against that form of work 
organization rendering such innovation unprofitable for the individual firm (Levine and 
Tyson, 1990).  
Prisoner's dilemma is a special case of externalities and characterizes a situation in 
which individually rational behavior is nonetheless inefficient because it generates a result 
that is less preferred by all the parties to a cooperative albeit unstable outcome. Thus, 
employee representation may benefit firm performance by boosting worker morale and 
motivation but remain dormant because of an absence of trust and a lack of credible 
commitments.  
Another source of market failure is adverse selection, typically associated with 
asymmetric information or an inability to distinguish among heterogeneous parties. Here, 
private contracting does not maximize the surplus because of the risks associated with 
worker/firm diversity. Thus, for example, a firm that voluntarily adopts a just cause 
dismissals policy as part and parcel of an employee participation exercise may be expected 
to attract a disproportionate share of workers who will shirk but yet be difficult to dismiss 
with cause (Levine, 1991).  
Opportunism may also militate against employee involvement or limit its exercise. 
Although participation may increase output and profitability, the superior access to 
information provided by management may be used opportunistically by workers to capture 
a bigger share of a rising joint surplus while profits fall both relatively and absolutely. As a 
result, employers may be expected to forego employee involvement or invest too little in it 
from a socially optimal perspective. 
Finally, the principal-agent problem arises from the informational edge of the 
employee agent over the employer principal stemming from asymmetric information. 
Employees are expected to leverage this private information for personal gain. Accordingly, 
attention has focused either on the use of financial incentives to de-risk the principal agent 
problem or the creation of an organization with shared values. The former route can be 
conceptualized as inducing the employee agent to undertake an action that is costly to that 
agent because it involves more effort than a second action. The nature of the problem is that 
the principal is unable to detect which course of action has been taken and, moreover, cannot 
infer that action from an observation of the employee’s output (though the employer can 
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observe whether revenues are high or low). The issue becomes one of devising a payment 
contract that incentivizes the employee to select the action that is more costly to that agent. 
The conventional solution involves a contract that will optimally trade off the worker’s wage 
against incentives for work. It is often thought that building a culture/creating shared values 
is a substitute strategy. However, if workers can be made to identify with the firm through 
firm investments in employee involvement and participation that transform workers from 
outsiders into insiders, such practices can actually lower the variation in compensation 
needed to motivate them to select the second route /action/. That is, increased worker 
commitment flattens the optimal wage schedule, such that monetary incentives and 
motivation can be complements (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Brown et al. 2011).  
All of the above arguments are encountered to varying degrees in justifying the two 
institutions of formal workplace representation. The crucial theoretical construct here is the 
notion of collective voice, which is to be contrasted with individualistic market mechanisms. 
In the model developed by Freeman and Medoff (1984), collective voice dominates 
individual voice (or exits) in continuity markets. A key reason is the public goods aspect of 
many working conditions. One solution to the resulting problems of an underprovision of 
information (and effort as well where there are complementarities in worker effort inputs) 
is unionism. Unions collect and aggregate individual worker preferences (and jointly 
determine effort inputs). No less important a function of collective voice is governance 
which refers to the policing or monitoring of incomplete contracts and mechanisms for 
ensuring that the parties to a contract are motivated to follow its terms without recourse to 
constant bargaining. Freeman and Medoff view unions as a commitment device: not only 
do unions provide workers with more accurate information about the state of nature but also 
prevent employers from engaging in opportunistic behavior in the case of worker 
investments in firm specific training or reliance investments (see also Malcomson, 1983).  
An integral part of governance is union bargaining power as there must be some 
threat of credible punishment by union of employer malfeasance. By the same token, rent 
seeking is the handmaiden of increased bargaining power. This threat of union hold-up was 
to stimulate interest in another form of collective voice. The next theoretical development 
was to argue that the institution of the works council offers improved prospects for an 
increase in the joint surplus of the enterprise by reason of its more thorough-going 
information exchange, consultation, and participation /codetermination powers than unions 
(Freeman and Lazear, 1995). In short, the works council has been portrayed as the potential 
exemplar of collective voice. Explicit recognition that changes in the distribution of the joint 
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surplus in favor of workers can be expected to accompany increases in that surplus, 
however, requires that some means of legal containment be sought in order to facilitate the 
optimal social provision of works councils. For example, changes in the labor code (e.g. a 
peace obligation and formal limitations on bargaining) offer the prospect of a decoupling 
the factors that determine the size of the surplus from those that determine its distribution. 
A final issue, already addressed in part in our discussion of principal-agent 
considerations and prisoner’s dilemma, is the role of trust. Our examination of the issue is 
perhaps best couched in terms of the dictum issued by the architects of collective voice 
themselves. Against the backdrop of disparate union productivity effects in underground 
U.S bituminous coal mining in the 1950s and 1960s, Freeman and Medoff (1984: 179) 
conclude: “The lesson is that unionism per se is neither a plus nor a minus to productivity. 
What matters is how unions and management interact at the workplace.” Our approach to 
the question of trust will be to examine the sensitivity of the correlates of the representation 
gap to variations in the quality of industrial relations. 
Studies with a focus on workplace representation and some links to extant ECS 
analyses 
We preface a statement of links between the present study and the themes of past research 
using the ECS with some U.S. findings on workplace committees from the Worker 
Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS), augmented by surveys conducted by 
Peter D. Hart Associates and summarized by Freeman (2007). Freeman observes that 
workers desire a workplace-committee form of representation; that is, the suggestion from 
the WRPS is that, given a choice between a union and a joint management employee 
committee that would meet and discuss problems, a little over one-half (52%) of workers 
selected the workplace committee option, and a little under one-quarter (23%) chose unions, 
the balance of opinion either being in favor of increased legal protection or opposing any 
independent organization at all. That said, when the union alternative was reworded in the 
survey as “an employee organization that would negotiate with management” support for 
this option rose by 8 percentage points while that for the workplace committee option fell 
by 6 percentage points. Moreover, the subsequent poll data pointed to no less than 76 percent 
of workers being desirous of material institutional change that would grant them voice at 
the workplace, either in the form of a workplace committee or union representation or both. 
Specifically, 39% of workers would vote for an employee association and a union, 35% for 
an association but not a union, and 2% would vote for unions and not an association. Some 
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14% were satisfied with the status quo ante and hence favored neither form of collective 
voice, the residual 10% were undecided. Accordingly, it is concluded that the desire for 
workplace committees is to be seen as one component of general demand among U.S. 
workers for a greater say at their workplace and not conflictual with the finding that more 
workers than ever before express a demand for union representation.  
The most recent U.S. study by Kochan et al. (2019) using the MIT 2017 Worker 
Choice Survey (2017) also considers the determinants of worker use of and satisfaction with 
joint employer-management committees and unions. The former entities are part of five 
‘internal’ mechanisms (e.g. filing grievances), and the latter one of seven ‘independent’ 
mechanisms (that also include industrial action). It is reported that there is in practice 
considerable variation in the voice options open to workers. Moreover, there is also 
considerable variation in worker satisfaction with these mechanisms. Although the main 
takeaway from this study is the evidence of a large unmet demand for union representation, 
this phenomenon is shown to be accompanied by significant use of a variety of voice options 
(see also Section 6). 
Turning to the ECS literature, emphasis has been upon the 2009 ECS. Force majeure, 
none of these studies examines the unmet demand for greater employee involvement at the 
workplace since that information is only contained in the 2013 ECS.  The topics that have 
been investigated include the determinants of the incidence and type of workplace 
representation (Forth et al., 2017), the behavioral implications of the formal representative 
voice institutions (Forth et al., 2017, Addison and Teixeira, 2019a), workplace 
representation and strikes (Jansen, 2014; Addison and Teixeira, 2019b), and workplace 
representation and financial performance (van den Berg et al., 2013). The present study is 
able to draw on this seemingly unrelated literature in four main ways. First, it builds on the 
distinction between works councils and union bodies made most explicit by Forth et al. 
(2017). Second, in common with van den Berg et al. (2013) it exploits country clusters, 
albeit in a posteriori fashion to begin with. Third, it draws on the analysis of strikes, and the 
work of Jansen (2014) in particular, to address the issue of whether variations in union 
organization – as reflected in workplace union density – influence the representation gap. 
Finally, past research on behavioral outcomes using the ECS, and beginning with Forth et 
al.’s (2017) proxy indicator for industrial relations quality (viz. a ‘quite strained’ or ‘very 
strained’ work climate), again flags the potentially important role of trust in mediating 
perceptions of the representation gap. 
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3.  The dataset   
This study uses the Employee Representative (ER) Questionnaire of the 3rd European 
Company Survey (ECS) of 2013, sponsored by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.  The raw establishment-based inquiry was 
downloaded from the U.K. Data Service site at https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/ and covers 
32 European nations. The ER Questionnaire is the second component of the ECS Survey, 
the first being the Management Questionnaire (MM). The MM Questionnaire is a 
representative survey covering 27,019 establishments with at least 10 employees in virtually 
all sectors of industrial activity from the private and public sectors, with the major exception 
of agriculture. In each country, the number of units being interviewed in the MM 
Questionnaire is around 500, 1,000, and 1,500 in small, medium, and large countries, 
respectively. MM interviews were conducted with the most senior official responsible for 
human resources management, who identifies official structures for employee 
representation at the establishment. Based on the identification of the most important 
employee representation body 7,629 ER valid interviews were subsequently conducted, 
which constitute around 50 percent of all those establishments in which the human resource 
manager had flagged the presence of employee representation. By construction, the 
respondent to the ER Questionnaire (identified in the ER raw data set by the variable 
er_type_er) is the person who is entitled to represent the opinions of the leading employee 
representation body at the workplace (see the 3rd ECS Technical Report, p. 16/82). As 
described in Appendix Table 1, the corresponding er_type_er national codes allow us 
therefore to fully allocate formal workplace employee representation by country.9 
 For the purposes of our analysis we focus on the 28 member countries of the 
European Union, for which we have 6,919 interviews (i.e. Iceland, Montenegro, Macedonia, 
and Turkey are not included in our selected sample). Recall that the key question (Q42a.A) 
used in the present inquiry – inquiring of the ER respondent whether he/she agreed or 
disagreed with the statement that the employee representation body should be involved more 
in the decision making in this establishment – is unique to the 2013 survey. That is, our 
dependent variable cannot therefore be observed in either of the two previous (2004 and 
2009) ECS cross sections.  
A second major aspect of our dataset construction concerns the resource base of 
worker representation and the method of management communication with that body. The 
resource base includes training provided for and time allotted to representation, while 
information provision focuses on the type of information provided and the manner of its 
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provision. These variables are either directly extracted from the raw ER Questionnaire or 
generated by our Stata coding combining two or more survey questions. In the case of the 
resource base, we selected the following four qualitative variables from the survey: 
employee representative is elected; employee representative receives training; frequency of 
meetings with management; and time allocated to employee representation is sufficient. The 
first variable indicates whether the representative was elected as opposed to being 
appointed; the second, whether the representative had received training related to his/her 
role; the third, the frequency of meetings (a 1 to 5 ordered variable such that the higher the 
value, the lower is the frequency); and the fourth indicates whether the time allocated to 
representation was adjudged sufficient by the respondent.  
In order to form the variable denoting the quality of information provided by 
management to the employee representation body we used questions 21 and 25 of the ER 
Questionnaire to generate a dichotomous variable flagging whether the information 
provided to the ER body on five issues affecting the establishment was “satisfactory” (see 
Appendix Table 2). Where management was stated to have provided no information on this 
range of issues, we simply presumed that information provision was unsatisfactory (and 
coded the variable as zero).   
For a subset of establishments, the ER Survey also gives information on situations 
in which major human resource (HR) decisions were taken by management in the preceding 
12 months that affected the entire establishment (e.g. changes in working time arrangements 
and various restructuring measures). This reduced sample comprises a maximum of some 
5,600 establishments for which it is possible to determine whether the employee 
representatives were informed by management, as well as assess the perceived influence or 
otherwise of the employee representative body in decision making on HR issues. In practice, 
this involved constructing the following two sets of variables: first, dummies for the ER 
body was only informed by management and the ER body was informed by management and 
asked to give its views or involved in the joint decision (in each case the omitted category 
being the ER body was not informed at all by management); and, second, a separate dummy 
indicating that the ER body had some or a strong influence on the management decision. 
In addition, three establishment size dummies and six sector dummies are also 
included in the baseline model specifications given below, the formal regression analysis 
being solely based on the ER dataset (i.e. on the responses of the employee representative 
actually interviewed at the workplace). Note that the introduction of (a wider set of) 
variables based on management responses requires use of the MM dataset and the 
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corresponding MM-ER linked data. In Section 5, however, as part of our sensitivity analysis 
we do summarize results from an exercise that includes MM variables. In this case, the 
specification is expanded to include broad sector, single-establishment organization, 
workforce composition by skill and occupation, and type of collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Finally, we also deploy a set of workplace climate and trust variables taken from the 
ER to determine the sensitivity of our results to different work settings. The four variables 
in question are introduced in the next section as they follow our major robustness check 
based upon different country configurations. Appendix Table 2 provides the full description 
of the ER variables included in the selected regression models, with the corresponding Stata 
coding being available upon request. 
 
4.  Modeling strategy  
We test the determinants of the representation gap at the EU establishment by specifying a 
two-level mixed-effects logit model that controls for type of workplace representation, 
employee representation resources and functioning, provision of information, and, for a 
subset of establishments in which a major decision has been taken in the last 12 months, 
consultation and participation in decision making. In a compact manner, the corresponding 
logistic regression model can be specified as:  
                                                    Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 1| 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗  ) = 𝐻(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑢𝑗),                 (1) 
where 𝐻(. ) is the logistic cumulative distribution function and 𝑖 and j are indices denoting 
establishment and country, respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is the dichotomous outcome variable indicating 
the shortfall in desired participation. It is extracted from responses to the question on 
whether the employee representation body should be more involved in decision making, 
taking the value of 1 where greater involvement is either strongly or very strongly desired, 
0 otherwise.  𝑥𝑖𝑗 captures the set of included regressors, while 𝑢𝑗  is the random intercept. 
In this setting, the information at the first-level (i.e. the establishment) is therefore 
nested within countries or clusters (the second level). A model that ignores this hierarchy 
would treat the observables as independent information, with implications for the 
conventional statistical tests. In particular, it would fail to recognize that (a) observations 
within clusters are correlated because individual responses from establishments are 
influenced by the groups/countries to which they belong, and (b) the properties of countries 
are influenced by the set of establishments that make up the group. Ignoring these 
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characteristics implies that the estimated standard errors are likely to be too small, thus 
generating spuriously significant results. Observe that in all the regressions reported in the 
next section, the log-likelihood ratio test comfortably rejects the null of an ordinary logit 
specification against the two-level mixed effects model. (Thus, the evidence rejects the 
hypothesis that the country (random) intercepts are not statistically different from one 
another.) Another advantage of our two-level mixed effects logistic model is that it allows 
us to test for the presence of random slopes; that is, whether, for example, the association 
between works council-type representation and the shortfall in desired participation varies 
by country. Other alternative non-linear regression models – namely the ordinary logistic 
model with country dummies and cluster-robust standard errors – were also implemented. 
These and other alternative approaches are documented in Section 5.  
Hopefully, the set 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is rich enough to capture most establishment-level 
heterogeneity. Simplifying, if the underlying model is given by 𝑌 = 𝑋𝐵 + 𝑈, with (𝑋, 𝑈 ) 
determining 𝑌, taking the conditional expectation gives 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈 = 𝑢) = 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑢. In 
this case, all sources of variation are accounted for and we have 𝑌 conditional on both 𝑋 
and 𝑈. If, however, one only conditions on 𝑋, then 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝑥𝐵 + 𝐸(𝑈|𝑋 = 𝑥), 
which may not yield 𝑦 = 𝑥𝐵 + 𝑢. In other words, running the hypothetical, deterministic 
model in (1) will not necessarily generate a 𝑈-constant (𝑌, 𝑋) relationship. The causal effect 
of 𝑋 on 𝑌 will not be identified. But the richer is the set of RHS variables, the greater is the 
chance that the two approaches will be ex post equivalent (see Heckman, 2008).  
Accordingly, if one suspects that workplace representation in particular might be 
adopted endogenously, the first-pass solution in the above framework is to include a wide 
range of observables. But we can also proceed in assessing the role workplace employee 
representative agencies by exploiting the national idiosyncrasies in our dataset; specifically, 
by using selected environment subsets as described below. In any event, although we have 
a considerable number of establishment-level characteristics in our data, it remains the case 
that all the experimentation is based on a single, cross-sectional data point. In this light, we 
cannot claim that an expansion of works council representation would close the 
representation gap. We do argue that such entities have the capacity to dissipate 
distributional struggles at the workplace and make management more willing to embrace 
them than union bodies, as a result of which council representatives may tend to express a 
reduced desire for greater involvement in decision making than their less endowed union 
counterparts. We therefore see our experimentation with the selected environmental subsets 
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and country clusters not as identifying a works council effect but only as a first-pass 
procedure. In other words, given sufficient stability of national environments, country 
grouping serves to strengthen the hypothesized correlational relationships specified in our 
baseline model. 
We defined four groups of countries based on actual (i.e. observed) country practices 
regarding employee representation. These a posteriori country sets are denoted by S1, S2, 
S3 and S4, indicating, respectively, countries with a works council-type representation only, 
countries with a union-type representation only, countries with dual systems but in which 
works council-type representation dominates (in more than 70% of the establishment cases), 
and countries with dual systems but in which union-type representation is found in more 
than 70% of the cases. These country sets are given in Appendix Table 3. They share 
important commonalities; in particular, the presence of formal employee representation in 
S1 and S2 is high, while in S4 it is low. For its part, the mean shortage in desired 
participation is sizable across all four sets, ranging from 63 (in S1) to 76 percent (in S4).   
For estimation purposes, we will combine the four country subsets in a particular 
manner. By way of illustration, consider S1 and S2. Clearly, it is not possible to predict what 
would be the shortfall in desired participation had an ‘uncovered’ establishment, say, in 
Germany or Sweden been covered by an ER body as all included units are by construction 
always ‘covered’ by some type of formal workplace representation.  However, we are in a 
position to know whether a union entity in S2 and a works council in S1 express a similar 
desire to have more participation in decision making, other things being equal. If, for 
example, the quality and timeliness of information provision is about the same in the two 
sets, the determinants of the perceived shortage are not likely to be too different. From this 
perspective, one might conjecture that the particular type of workplace representation in 
place is of no importance, and that only ‘coverage’ and the provision of quality information 
matter. An analogous exercise can be conducted using different combinations of S1, S2, S3, 
and S4 (see below).  
As mentioned earlier, robustness of the results based on the S1 through S4 a 
posteriori country classification is also discussed in the context of two alternatives based on 
a priori sets of country clusters suggested by the worker participation/collective bargaining 
literatures. The first alternative uses the same country clusters as employed by van den Berg 
et al. (2013); the second is based on Eurofound's analytical framework “Mapping Varieties 
of Industrial Relations” (Eurofound, 2017). The two exercises are presented in full and 
summary form, respectively, in Section 5. 
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We supplement the robustness analysis of the baseline model using variations in trust 
and cooperation between the parties, namely the quality of industrial relations in a broad 
sense as assessed by the employee representative (e.g. Brown et al., 2015). In this case, we 
deploy the following four variables: management makes sincere efforts to involve the 
employee representation; the relationship between management and employee 
representation is hostile; management can be trusted; and the presence of a good or very 
good work climate at the establishment. A description of each variable is given in Appendix 
Table 2. Our approach therefore will be to use different subsamples in order to uncover 
suggestive patterns in the data (see the discussion of Table 5, below). The corresponding 
results will then inform us about the possible role of the included factors in selected 
environments. We would anticipate that lack of management commitment, a hostile 
relationship between the two parties, an untrustworthy management, or a bad work climate 
will tend to be associated with a marked shortfall in desired participation, irrespective of the 
form of workplace representation as presumably in this scenario the type of information 
provision will be rather poor, especially against a backdrop of major HR decisions. Again, 
if for example the workplace environment is non-hostile, then one might expect a greater 
desire for involvement whenever the dialogue between the parties is less than effective, 
which in turn is a function of the quality of information provision and the actual level of 
influence in decision making. 
Finally, to simplify the interpretation of the results, we will only report the 
corresponding marginal effects, obtained by fixing the random country effects at their 
theoretical mean (i.e. zero) and all included regressors at their sample mean. By design, the 
model allows us to establish statistically strong associations between the representation gap 
and the selected set of covariates. 
5.  Findings 
Table 1 provides the establishment-level means of the key variables included in the baseline 
model by type of workplace representation, and by country clusters, both for the entire 
sample and for the reduced sample of establishments with a major HR decision in the last 
12 months. There is a visible shortfall in participation; that is, respondents are on average 
desirous of greater involvement in more than 70 percent of the cases. There is also some 
suggestion that this perceived shortfall in workplace representation is higher among union 
than works council establishments (by a 10 percentage point margin) while this shortfall 
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ranges between 63 to 77 percent across the different country subsets. But the abiding 
impression is that the perceived deficit in workplace representation is across the board. 
 [Table 1 near here] 
Regarding the other arguments in panel (a) of Table 1, those in the second block 
dealing with the resources and functioning of the ER body have means that are quite flat for 
establishments in the first three columns. That said, the variability across the country 
subsamples is clearly greater, especially with respect to the percentage of elected 
representatives and the likelihood that the representative received training. Here, elected 
members are more common in S1 and S4, while training is more common in S1 and S2. 
However, in no case for the country subsets does the difference exceed 20 percentage points. 
Differences in the provision of information in the third block of panel (a) of the table 
seem to be even smaller across columns. Satisfaction with information provision is lower in 
union establishments (by a 10 percentage point margin) and it is also smaller in union-only 
and unions-rule countries (i.e. in S2 and S4). In establishments with major HR decisions – 
shown in panel (b) of the table – the differences across samples are clearly smaller than in 
panel (a), suggesting that in difficult times or in times of disruption communication tends to 
improve somewhat, while the desire for participation is elevated. 
Although differences across columns in the table are never dramatic, they are in our 
view sufficiently tangible for us to anticipate that the observed variation can be helpful in 
designing strategies with a view to establishing robust correlational relationships in the data. 
Before turning to these, however, a digression worth pursuing at this point is whether the 
desire for more participation by the ER body is also shared by the employees at the 
establishment. In other words, is the ER representative a reliable source of the views of all 
employees at the workplace or is it the case that the respondent simply represents the views 
of the ER body? Our test is perforce indirect as only the opinion of the ER respondent is 
recorded in the ECS survey. To make the case as clearly as possible, we consider the subset 
of establishments with recent experience of a major HR decision. We then use the answers 
to questions Q20A and Q20B of the ER Questionnaire to search for any obvious 
contradiction in the respondent’s assessment of the shortage in workplace representation. 
Our testing hypothesis can be stated as follows: if the respondent disagrees with the 
statement in question Q20A (that is, if he/she says that employees do not value the work of 
the employee representation), while at the same time also disagreeing with the statement 
that employees rarely express interest in the outcome of consultations or negotiations 
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(question Q20B), then the shortage in desired participation should be expected to be at its 
maximum because in this case the ER body is presumably not delivering the goods. If our 
prediction is correct, the conclusion would be that the ER respondent is probably reliable in 
expressing the overall view of employees. The diagnosis is given in Appendix Table 4. The 
mean of 84 percent in the first column of that table suggests that the representative is not an 
unreliable source of the opinion of the employees.10 
Table 2 presents the results of the two-level mixed effects logistic regression for the 
baseline model specified in equation (1). Column (1) of the table uses the full sample of 
establishments with formal workplace representation, while column (2) restricts the sample 
to those units with a major HR decision taken in the last 12 months and for which we have 
additional information. The table thus provides the responses of the leading representatives 
of employee representation bodies at the establishment level as to their perceptions of the 
degree of involvement in decision making of their agencies, conditional on the set of 
observables. If, as hypothesized earlier, works councils are exemplary voice institutions, we 
might expect any perceived deficit in participation to be smaller in such establishments than 
among their counterparts with union workplace representation or subordinate union 
representation. Indeed, we obtain a highly statistically significant negatively signed works 
council coefficient estimate in the first block of regressors, with a corresponding marginal 
effect of 9 percentage points in column (1). The marginal effect in this case gives the change 
in the outcome variable associated with a change in works council dummy from 0 to 1, 
setting all the random country intercepts at zero (their theoretical mean). The statistical 
evidence on the relationship between an establishment’s union density and the shortfall in 
participation is much weaker, with the respective marginal effect not being statistically 
different from zero. The results in column (2) confirm the works council result, while union 
density is now statistically different from zero at the 0.05 level, suggesting that the variable 
is somewhat more of a factor in the event of major changes in the organization. 
[Table 2 near here] 
The second block of regressors detail the scope of workplace representation, namely, 
its resource base and the method and manner of communication. For all four selected 
covariates the relationship with the shortfall in desired representation is highly statistically 
significant (at the 0.01 level): a positive correlation in the cases of an elected employee 
representative and a trained employee representative, and where there is low frequency of 
meetings with management; and a negative association in circumstances where the time 
allotted to employee representation is adjudged sufficient. Alternatively put, an adequate 
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level of involvement requires some frequency of meetings with decision makers as well as 
a sufficient amount of time being allocated to the representation process. On the other hand, 
elected representatives and those who have received training express a heightened desire for 
greater involvement of workplace representation in decision making; across both columns 
(1) and (2) the marginal effects approximate 6 and 3 percentage points, respectively. 
A key aspect is the role played by the provision of information in general, the 
hypothesis being that the higher the degree of satisfaction with the information provided by 
management, the less likely are employee representatives to press for greater involvement 
in decision making. Recall that the variable measures the extent to which the information 
provided by management to the ER body (covering areas such as the financial and 
employment situation of the establishment, the introduction of new products/services and 
processes, and even its strategic plans) is adjudged satisfactory by the employee 
representative. The well-determined negative sign of the coefficient estimate confirms this 
expectation (and the converse), with very large marginal effects of 27 and 22 percentage 
points in columns (1) and (2), respectively. 
The major HR decision variable in column (1) suggests that, other things equal, 
threatened disruptions in establishment activities are associated with an increased desire for 
ER involvement. This relationship is captured by the positive coefficient of the variable, 
which is highly statistically significant and implies a marginal effect of approximately 10 
percentage points.11 
As was noted earlier, for the subset of establishments in column (2) – that is, 
establishments where a major decision was taken by management in the last 12 months – 
we have an extended number of arguments that pertain to the quality of information 
provision together with a single measure of the perceived influence of the ER body in the 
ensuing decision making process. In the former category, we have three qualitative 
information levels: no information at all (the omitted category); information provision but 
no substantive involvement of the ER body; and information provision complemented by 
discussion and joint decision making. In the case of the separate perceived influence 
variable, we deploy a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the ER body had some or a strong 
influence on the management decision, 0 otherwise. Our expectations are that a higher 
quality of information provision in respect of major decisions should be associated with a 
smaller shortfall in desired participation, and that greater influence of the workplace 
employee representative body in decision making should also be associated with a smaller 
representation gap.  The direction of the marginal effects is as anticipated and each is again 
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quite substantial (at 13 percentage points in the former case and 6 percentage points in the 
latter). 12 
Note finally that model (1) assumes that country heterogeneity is captured by our 
mixed effects implementation. The model therefore gives an estimate of both the role of 
observables and the unobservable random country effects. The log-likelihood ratio 
diagnostic test at the base of the table indicates that the null of a zero random variation in 
the intercept is comfortably rejected.13  
The results of fitting the model to country subsets are provided in Table 3. From a 
total of 12 (meaningful) cases containing one, two, and three sets of countries – that is, {S3}, 
{S4}, {S1, S2}, {S1, S3}, {S1, S4}, {S2, S3}, {S2, S4}, {S3, S4}, {S1, S2, S3}, {S1, S2, 
S4}, {S1, S3, S4}, {S2, S3, S4} – we focus on just six of them. These are: Case 1, which 
includes establishments in S1 and S2 countries; Case 2, with establishments in S3 and S4; 
Cases 3 and 4, respectively comprising S3 and S4 establishments; Case 5, with 
establishments in S1 and S4; and, finally, Case 6, with establishments in S1 and S3. Note 
that the {S1} and {S2} cases are necessarily excluded as they have no within-variation in 
union/works council status. Recall that the composition of subsets S1, S2, S3, and S4 is 
given in Appendix Table 3.) 
[Table 3 near here] 
For each of these six cases in Table 3, we again provide results for all establishments 
(columns (1)) and for those establishments with a major HR decision (columns (2)). This 
procedure is intended to make comparisons with the baseline model in Table 2 more 
straightforward. Case 1, for example, addresses the issue of whether perceived shortfalls in 
involvement are similar in ‘works council only’ and ‘union only’ countries, controlling for 
other covariates. Given the country subsets in question, our presumption in this case is that 
the works council and union workplace representation entities are unlikely to perform very 
dissimilar functions. In other words, once the resource base and the quality of information 
are taken into account, it is probable that the perceived shortfall in participation will be 
broadly similar across establishments in S1 and S2 nations. However, according to our 
estimates, for Case 1 in column (1), there is a statistically significant difference – at the 0.10 
level – across the two types of representation in favor of works councils, although this result 
does not carry over to column (2). All the other marginal effects have the expected sign. 
Their statistical significance is generally smaller than in Table 2, a result that can be 
attributed to the corresponding reduction in sample size. 
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In Case 2, we compare establishments in ‘works councils-rule’ countries with those 
in ‘unions-rule’ countries, namely subsets S3 and S4, respectively. Both the minority 
establishments with union agencies in S3 and works councils in S4 are retained in the 
estimation sample. The goal here is to examine both the role of employee representation and 
the importance of the resource base and quality of information provision in countries that 
have a distinct ‘majority’ practice. The source of variation in this case arises from the 
comparison of works councils and unions entities, both present in S3 and S4 countries. We 
confirm in columns (1) and (2) that the marginal effect of the works council variable is again 
negative. Contrary to Case 1, the union density argument is now statistically significant (and 
positive). Given the increase in sample size, all the other arguments have the expected signs 
and in general a higher level of statistical significance.   
 Case 3 serves to test whether it is possible to distinguish works councils from union 
agencies, now exclusively based on the subset of works councils-rule countries. We obtain 
statistically significant negatively signed coefficient estimates for the works council 
dummy. The corresponding marginal effects in columns (1) and (2) fall within the 5 to 7 
percentage point range. A similar exercise is conducted for Case 4, that is, for the unions-
rule countries. Here, the less than 25 percent of establishments with works council 
representation are sufficient to confirm that establishments having works council 
representation are seemingly associated with lower perceived shortfalls in involvement. 
Finally, the role of employee representation is examined contrasting works councils in S1 
and S4 with (majority) union agencies in S4 (Case 5), and works councils in S1 and S3 with 
minority (union) agencies in S3 (Case 6). In both cases, our priors are again confirmed.  
We address the sensitivity of the results in Table 3 to alternative clusters based on 
an a priori classification of countries.  In the first alternative we follow van den Berg et al. 
(2013), who define five country subsets: a Germanic cluster/S1_1 (containing Germany, 
Austria, Netherlands); a  Scandinavian cluster/S2_1 (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); a 
French cluster/S3_1 (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece); 
an Anglo-Saxon cluster/S4_1 (Ireland and the United Kingdom); and a Transition 
cluster/S5_1 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia). (Note that Malta, Cyprus, and Croatia are not included 
in any of these subsets.) In similar fashion to Table 3, these five subsets can generate a 
number of experiments. We illustrate just four of the possible cases in Appendix Table 5, 
namely those we judge to be more meaningful and more comparable with Table 3. Thus, in 
the first main column of the appendix table, we have a subsample comprising the Germanic 
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and Scandinavian clusters (Case 1). Note that in both columns (1) and (2) the works council 
variable is insignificant. As in Case 1 in Table 3 our interpretation is that the representation 
gap (or the shortfall in desired employee representation) in this grouping does not seem to 
vary much across the type of worker representation (i.e. either works council or union 
agency). The results for the French cluster are given in the second main column (Case 2). 
For this case we confirm that works councils are strongly associated with a smaller gap. The 
third main column in turn illustrates the situation in Eastern European/transition countries 
(Case 3), and the works council variable is again negative and highly significant. In the final 
main column of the table we select the Germanic and French clusters (Case 4) to effect a 
comparison between works council and union representation. Clearly, both the sign and 
statistical significance of the works council marginal effects fall within the expected range.  
We also briefly summarize findings from an alternative classification based on a 
mapping suggested by Eurofound (2017). Five clusters are again identified, termed Centre-
west, Nordic, South, West, and Centre-east.14 Based on these five groups, we then carried 
out an exercise analogous to that presented in Appendix Table 5. On this occasion Case 1 
was defined as containing countries from the Centre-west and the Nordic clusters, while 
Cases 2 through 4 comprise the South cluster (Case 2), Centre-east cluster (Case 3), and the 
Centre-west and South clusters (Case 4). The results from this experiment confirm that the 
marginal effect of the works council variable is insignificant in Case 1, while it remains 
negative and significant in Case 3. The negative marginal effect is also confirmed in Case 
4. In Case 2, the works marginal effect is insignificant. The full results are available upon 
request. 
In sum, the results in Table 3 and from the replication using two alternative country 
cluster configurations offer little reason to suspect that the associations earlier reported for 
our baseline model are specific to a specific cluster construct. That is, union representation 
and a less well-informed employee representation body alike are associated with heightened 
demands for greater involvement of the agency in decision making throughout. 
We next examine the baseline model taking account of variations in the quality of 
industrial relations. We expect lack of engagement on the part of management, or an absence 
of trust between the parties, to be associated with widespread dissatisfaction among the 
cadre of employee representatives. It remains therefore to be seen whether a ‘bad 
environment’ is associated with a desire for more participation in decision making 
independent of the type of workplace representation. In turn, if the environment is more 
favorable one might expect the shortfall in participation to be dependent on the provision of 
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information. In these circumstances, might not one conclude that ‘effective’ ER-
management interaction is more often found in works councils than in union workplace 
representation agencies, all else constant? We address this issue by separating the sample 
into relevant subsets of good and bad industrial relations quality. 
[Table 4 near here]  
To begin with, we present some descriptive statistics in Table 4. For illustrative 
purposes, we will focus on just one of four proxies that we will be using to control for the 
quality of industrial relations in our subsequent regression analysis. Specifically, we take 
the case of a question seeking to gauge the reaction of the employee representative to the 
statement: management makes a sincere effort to involve the employee representation in 
solving joint problems (question Q20D in the survey, variable q20_d_D). It can be seen 
from the cross tabulations in the table that there is a perceived lack of engagement by 
management in a minority of cases (viz. 20 percent of the representatives do not 
agree/strongly agree with the statement), and that this lack of cooperation is strongly 
associated with the reported shortfall in participation (in 92 percent of the cases). Observe 
also that union workplace representation tends to be associated with a greater shortfall in 
desired participation in the presence of a sincere effort by management to involve employee 
representation in solving joint problems. This pattern can be replicated in its entirety if we 
replace q20_d_D by either q20_c_D, q42a_c_D or q44_D as an alternative measure of 
industrial relations quality. These variables are described in Appendix Table 2 and the 
corresponding results are available upon request. 
 [Table 5 near here] 
Table 5 provides the corresponding multivariate analysis for the example given in 
Table 4 and for the additional three proxies for the quality of industrial relations.  The four 
examples are designated as Cases A through D. For each case, we have two separate samples 
in columns (1) and (2), comprising establishments in which according to the responses of 
the employee representative interviewed the ‘quality’ of industrial relations is adjudged to 
be ‘high’ and ‘low,’ respectively (or equivalently for one of the cases, ‘by no means hostile’ 
and ‘hostile’). The dependent variable is again the perceived shortfall in workplace 
representation.  In column (1) for Case A we confirm that the desire to be more involved is 
higher when representation is via a union entity rather than through a works council; and 
that the desire is an inverse function of the effectiveness of the interaction between the two 
parties (as proxied by adequate information provision and influence in decision making).  
Column (2) in turn indicates that there is insufficient variability across the two types of 
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representation. That is, lack of engagement on the part of management is associated 
throughout with insufficient information and influence.15 These disparate results are also 
found for Cases B through D, and where the variation in statistical significance from column 
(1) to column (2) can be related to pronounced changes in sample size. Our conclusions are 
therefore as follows. A ‘bad’ industrial relations environment (characterized by a lack of 
engagement by management, or the presence of a hostile relationship, or a lack of trust in 
management, or an absence of a good/very good work climate) is associated with a greater 
shortfall in workplace representation and basically no role is played by the type of workplace 
representation. The corollary is that whenever the industrial relations environment is ‘good’ 
the presence of a works council is in general associated with a higher level of satisfaction 
regarding participation in critical decisions of the organization and manifested in a lessened 
desire for greater involvement.  
6.  Conclusions 
Our overriding concern has been with the relative ‘effectiveness’ of one type of formal 
workplace representation over the other – either a prevailing works council or a prevailing 
union entity – based on the degree to which the designated representative of the relevant 
body expresses a desire for greater participation. Data from the Employee Representative 
Questionnaire of the 2013 European Company Survey was used to establish, firstly, the 
extent to which there was a perceived need for greater involvement of these bodies in 
decision making – our measure of the shortfall in this form of voice – and, secondly, to 
identify the correlates of differences in these magnitudes across establishments.  
Our modeling strategy initially involved estimating a two-level mixed effects 
baseline model across all 28 EU nations for an all-establishments sample and for the subset 
containing only those establishments in which major HR decisions had been taken by 
management in the preceding 12 months. Next, we identified groups of countries according 
to four types of workplace representation: works councils alone; union bodies alone; dual 
systems in which work councils predominate; and dual systems in which union bodies 
predominate. These empirically derived sets were then used in different combinations to 
evaluate the sensitivity of the baseline model. As a further check we used two a priori sets 
of country clusters suggested by the worker participation/collective bargaining literatures. 
In a final application, and this time for the subset of establishments subject to management 
decisions likely to affect the entire workforce, we sought to uncover the mediating influence 
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of (several indicators of) the quality of industrial relations as perceived by worker 
representatives. 
One result to emerge from our baseline model was that the desire for greater 
involvement in the organization of work is smaller in those circumstances where workplace 
representation is via a works council-type apparatus rather than through the agency of a 
union body. This result may be attributed to the enhanced voice and governance properties 
of the works council set within the framework of a more integrative (as opposed to 
distributive) bargaining process. There was no suggestion that this finding was driven by 
one or two dominant countries; in particular, Germany and the Netherlands with their more 
highly developed councils. Furthermore, there was little to indicate that this finding was 
more reflective of works council satisfaction than influence. Although concerns about 
endogeneity and causality inevitably arise in analyzing cross sectional data of this type, we 
sought to convince the reader that the conditional correlations found with respect to works 
councils were indeed informative and not noise. First, using the matched MM-ER dataset 
we were able to expand an already comprehensive array of right-hand-side variables (to 
include workforce composition and collective bargaining type) in the baseline model. 
Second, and as noted earlier, we were able to estimate the model over diverse country 
subsets or clusters. In both cases, we continued to find a negative association between works 
council presence and the perceived shortfall in representation.  
Support was also adduced for the argument that where employee representatives are 
kept sufficiently (i.e. ‘satisfactorily’) informed on a number of establishment issues (e.g. the 
financial situation, the introduction of new products and processes, and strategic plans with 
respect to business targets and investments) the desire for greater involvement of the 
employee representative body in decision making is lessened, and that this is also the case 
in circumstances of major organizational change where the worker representation agency is 
informed by management and asked to give its views or is actually involved in joint 
decision-making. The resource base was also relevant. Thus, a higher frequency of meetings 
with management and the provision of sufficient time for fulfilling the representative 
function was associated with a diminution in the representation gap. On the other hand, 
elected as opposed to appointed representatives, as well as those who had recent training 
related to their role, voiced a greater desire for more involvement. Again, when we reran 
the equation(s) by country subsets, the correlations earlier reported for type of workplace 
representation, the resource base, and the provision of information were not specific to any 
particular national environment.  
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In a final exercise based on variations in the quality of the industrial relations 
climate, the employee representative typically revealed an overwhelming desire for greater 
participation whenever management was adjudged to be uncooperative and untrustworthy. 
Any favorable cet. par. association between works council presence and the perceived 
shortfall in desired representation was now confined to cooperative industrial relations 
regimes. Yet this was not generally the case for the provision of information to the employee 
representation body; for example, the negative correlation between satisfactory information 
exchange and the representation gap remained statistically significant across all measures 
of variations in the quality of industrial relations.  
This brings us in conclusion to the vexed question of policy, given the finding of 
major deficits in their involvement in decision making reported by employees and their 
representatives, against the backdrop of the emergence of some positive effects of 
workplace representation – not least works councils – in separate studies of economic and 
industrial relations performance for a variety of datasets including the ECS.  Unfortunately, 
as Kaufman (2000: 546) has noted, there is no indication in any of the representation studies 
of price, only preferences (added to which the causal links between participation and 
performance have often proved elusive). Providing the full amount of participation and 
presentation desired by workers and their representatives is likely to be costly. That said, 
our case for collective voice has been based on market imperfections and coordination 
failures. Abstracting from issues of social justice, these are the bases for policy.  
Some observers have duly argued that the measure of reform should be predicated 
on the extent of market failure, seeking major inroads into the representation gap for those 
workforce groups that need the protection of independent labor unions, but favoring a mix 
of less powerful and independent entities where more competitive conditions prevail. More 
generally, the prerequisites for legal reforms in this area have been identified by Hirsch 
(2004: 439), who argues that they should be value enhancing to both the parties and the 
economy, involve a greater role for voice within nonunion as well as union workplaces, 
allow for variation in workplace governance across heterogeneous workplaces, permit 
flexibility within workplaces over time, and limit rent seeking on the part of worker 
organizations.16 
This returns us to the issue of heterogeneity in voice mechanisms. Bryson et al. 
(2013) report for Britain that a major increase in ‘nonunion direct voice’ – team briefings, 
problem solving groups, and regular meeting with team managers – has accompanied the 
strong decline in union voice. The implication is that nonunion workers without 
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representation are not thereby necessarily deprived of voice. The caveat is of course that the 
growth in the former cannot causally be laid at the door of the operating inefficiency of the 
latter in the absence of data on the costs of the various voice types. Some amplification is 
offered by Kochan et al. (2019) in their wide-ranging study of worker representation in the 
U.S., earlier reviewed in section 2.17 Having explored variation in the use of different voice 
options and worker satisfaction with those options, Kochan et al. (2019: 310) conclude that 
“today ‘no one-sized ‘shoe’ fits all workers.” Noting the fit between some workers and 
internal options (i.e. those provided by the firm) and that between other workers and 
independent options such as unions, and how these can vary by issues, they call for a policy 
that helps develop multi-option systems. That is a worthy basis for policy and arguably 
European legislation is moving in a more flexible direction even if the devil – for example, 








1. The findings are based on the Worker Representation and Participation Survey 1994. For 
studies of earlier U.S. Department of Labor Surveys, see Quinn and Staines, 1979; Kochan, 
1979.   
2. See, respectively, the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 and the British 
Worker Representation and Participation Survey 2001. 
3. Thus, Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU states that “workers or 
their representatives must, at the appropriate level be guaranteed information and 
consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided by Community law 
and national laws and practices.” 
4. The legislation complements the information and consultation provisions of extant law 
on collective dismissals (Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998), transfers of undertakings 
(Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001) and, in the transnational context, on European 
Works Councils (Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994). 
5. For a recent assessment of the legal foundations of worker voice at the member state and 
EU levels, see Hassel et al. (2018: Chapter 7).  
6. This database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts contains annual data for all OECD and EU member states on 
these four key elements. For the most recent version, see Visser (2019).   
7. For an informative preliminary analysis of formal employee representation or workplace 
social dialogue at the EU workplace, see Eurofound (2015: Chapter 11).   
 
8. Added to these economic reasons for a likely shortfall in participation (of indeterminate 
magnitude at this stage), are the non-economic criteria of social justice and industrial 
democracy. Such concepts are not examined here but they reflect limited opportunities for 
the expression of voice in certain parts of the job market (e.g. the gig economy; on which 
see Johnston and Land-Kazlauskas, 2019) and tendencies toward rising economic 
inequality. 
 
9. Note that based on the er_type_er raw codes given in Appendix Table 1 we draw in 
practice a distinction between formal and informal workplace representation. By way of 
illustration, formal workplace representation in the United Kingdom requires the presence 
of some recognized shop floor trade union representation or of a joint consultative 
committee, any ad hoc form of worker representation being classified as informal. Purely 
occupational safety and health committees are also treated as informal representation 
throughout. Our analysis focuses exclusively on formal workplace representation. 
 
10. At a significance level of 0.05 or better, the mean-comparison test always rejects the 
hypothesis that there is no difference in means between the first cell in Appendix Table 4 
and the second, third, and fourth cells. 
 
11. Table 2 is solely based on the ER dataset. An extended model with MM variables –  that 
is, with observables extracted from management responses to the MM Questionnaire –
provides no indication that their inclusion changes the nature or the magnitude of the 
estimated marginal effects. In the extended specification, the additional (MM) regressors, 
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adumbrated in Section 3, were generally not statistically significant. Given that the MM-ER 
linked data involve a substantial reduction in sample size, our analysis in this section will 
continue to be based on the ER dataset. The results with the selected MM variables are 
available upon request. 
 
12. As suggested by one of the reviewers, we carried out several experiments in the context 
of Table 2. Specifically, we sequentially dropped Germany, the Netherlands, and both 
countries from the sample. All included variables maintained their sign, significance and 
magnitude in both columns (1) and (2). In addition, although not all representatives are 
elected, we re-estimated the baseline model excluding this variable.  There was virtually no 
change in the results other than in the case of the union density coefficient estimate which 
became significant at the 0.10 level in the all-establishment case.   
 
13. We used a cluster bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2009) to 
evaluate the sensitivity of the standard errors reported in Table 2. Although clustering is 
expected to increase standard errors, especially if the regressors are highly correlated within 
the cluster, we found a tendency toward a slight decrease across-the-board. Similar results 
were reported for Tables 3 through 5. The standard errors obtained from using the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimators (VCE), that is, the vce (cluster country) option in the 
melogit command line, were very similar to the cluster bootstrap case. We are grateful to 
one of our reviewers for suggesting this application. Finally, we note that the results also 
hold after running an ordinary logistic model with country dummies, and that the 
corresponding (cluster-robust) standard errors again exhibited a slight decreasing tendency 
in comparison with those reported in Table 2.   
 
14.  More formally these are a Centre-west/social partnership cluster (made up of Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Slovenia); a Nordic/organized 
corporatism cluster (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); a South/state-centered cluster 
(Greece, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain); a West/liberal pluralism cluster (Cyprus, 
Ireland, Malta, and the U.K.); and a Centre-east /mixed model-transition economies cluster 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia). 
 
15. To illustrate, observe that the lack of engagement by management in column (2) is 
strongly mirrored in a lower sample probability that the information provision is 
satisfactory, a higher probability that the ER body will not be informed by management in 
the event of a major HR decision, and a lower probability that the entity will have a strong 
influence on decision making, at 47, 31, and 45 percent, respectively. In column (1), the 
corresponding probabilities are 87, 9, and 75 percent. 
 
16. Hirsch proceeds to identify two lines of approach that may be value enhancing for the 
United States. The first is conditional deregulation, which perhaps has most obvious appeal 
in the United States given the strictures of section 8 (a)(2) of the National Labor Relations 
Act. The second involves changes in the labor law default away from its setting of non-
unionized to another standard that promotes the value-enhancing arrangements, while 
limiting the ability of works councils to appropriate rents. He concludes that the latter 
constraint is real so that the new default will have to tread a difficult path, although he deems 




17. For a very different perspective on worker voice than offered by the direct voice of 
Bryson et al. (2013), and the independent voice mechanisms in Kochan et al. (2019), see the 
distinctive analysis of Marsden (2013) of the effect of unions and works councils (and their 
job-level counterparts in the form of shop stewards and employee delegates) on the 
expression of individual voice in French workplaces. Marsden concludes that individual and 
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TABLE 1  
Establishment-Level Means of the Estimation Sample for the Baseline Model and Country 
Clusters Analysis (in percent) 





Union S1 S2 S3 S4 
(a) Establishments with and without a major HR decision taken in the last 12 months 
Shortage in workplace 
representation 
70 66 76 63 70 71 77 
ER resources and 
functioning: 
       
Elected employee 
representative 
83 80 86 88 75 73 91 
Employee representative 
receives training 
 47 45 49 59 61 44 42 
Time allocated to employee 
representation is sufficient 
 88 89 86 87 95 90 84 
Frequency of meeting with 
management 
 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.6 
Provision of information to the ER body: 
Information provided by 
management to the ER body 
is satisfactory 
79 84 73 84 75 81 73 
Number of observations 5,531 2,958 2,573 924 639 1,903 1578 
(b) Establishments with a major HR decision taken in the last 12 months 
Shortage in workplace 
representation 
74 70 79 63 70 75 81 
Provision of information to 
the ER body: 
       
The ER body was not 
informed at all by 
management 
14 13 14 9 8 17 15 
The ER body was only 
informed by management 
19 20 18 16 13 21 20 
The ER body was informed 
by management and asked to 
give their views or involved 
in joint decision 
67 67 68 75 79 62 65 
ER influence in the case of 
major HR decisions: 
       
The ER body had some or a 
strong influence on the 
decision making 
69 69 70 80 81 65 69 
Number of observations 4,178 2,210 1,968 672 542 1,484 1,201 
Notes: The mean values are given in percentage points except in the case of the frequency of 
meetings with management, which is an ordered variable from 1 (the highest) to 5 (the lowest). Full 
definition of the variables is given in Appendix Table 2. Country subsets: S1 (Germany, Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg); S2 (Sweden, Cyprus, and Malta); S3 (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Italy, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Finland); S4 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Ireland, Spain, 
Greece, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom).  




Analysis of the Shortfall in Desired Employee Workplace Representation (ER), 
Baseline Regressions for All Establishments and for Establishments with a Major HR 





Establishments with a 
major HR decision in 
the last 12 months. 
(2) 
Type of workplace representation and labor 
organization: 
  










ER resources and functioning:   















Frequency of meetings with management (1-5 ordered 





Provision of information to the ER body:   
Information provided by management to the ER body is 











Provision of information to the ER body in the case 
of major HR decisions:  
(Reference category: The ER body was not 
informed by management.) 
  




The ER body was informed by management and asked 





ER influence in the case of major HR decisions:   
The ER body had some or a strong influence on the 
decision making (1/0 dummy) 
 -.063*** 
(.018) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes 
Establishment size dummies Yes Yes 
Number of observations 5,531 4,178 
LR test  272.76 195.42 
Notes: The dependent variable is a 1/0 dummy, defined as 1 if the workplace employee 
representation body should be more involved in decision making, 0 otherwise. The coefficients 
of the multilevel, mixed effects model are estimated using the melogit command in Stata 13.1. 
The log-likelihood ratio tests the null of an ordinary logit specification versus the two-level 
mixed effects model. The null is always comfortably rejected in favor of the mixed effects 




    TABLE 3 
Analysis of the Shortfall in Desired Employee Workplace Representation in Selected Subsamples, for all Establishments and for Establishments 
with a Major HR Decision Taken in the Last 12 Months, Marginal Effects 
 Case 1 
S1 and S2 
countries 
Case 2 






S1 and S4 
countries 
Case 6 
S1 and S3 
countries  
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
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Frequency of meetings with management (1-5 


























Provision of information to the ER body:             
Information provided by management to the ER body 

























             
A major HR decision has been taken in the last 12 














Provision of information to the ER body in the 
case of major HR decisions:  
(Reference category: The ER body was not 
informed by management.) 
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The ER body was informed by management and 


















ER influence in the case of major HR decisions:             
The ER body had some or a strong influence on the 













Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,563 1,214 3,481 2,685 1,903 1,484 1,578 1,201 2,502 1,873 2,827 2,156 
LR test 26.73 20.28 156.21 126.22 91.69 94.01 61.64 26.10 96.62 59.34 133.88 121.50 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Country subsamples are defined in Appendix Table 3. Column (1) denotes all establishments, while column (2) refers to establishments 
with a major HR decision in the last 12 months. To clarify the modeling strategy: in Case 1 the works council agency in S1 countries is compared with union 
representation in S2 countries; in Case 2 ‘works council rule’ is compared with ‘union rule’ (minority unions in S3 and minority works councils in S4 are retained 
in the sample); in Case 3 the ‘majority works council’ is compared with the ‘minority union’; in Case 4 the ‘majority union’ is compared with the ‘minority works 
council’; in Case 5 the works council is compared with the ‘majority union’ in S4 (minority works councils are retained in S4); and, finally, in Case 6 the works 
council is compared with the ‘minority union’ in S3 (majority works councils are retained in S3). ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 






Cross Tabulations of the Perceived Quality of Industrial Relations, Workplace Employee 
Representation, and the Shortfall in Desired Participation, All Establishments (in percent) 
 
 Workplace representation  
Union Works council Row total 
 
Management makes sincere efforts to involve the 





25 [ 92 ] 17 [ 92 ] 20 
YES 
q20_d_D=1 
75 [ 70 ] 83 [ 61 ] 80 
Column total 100 100  
 
Notes: The shortfall in participation is given in brackets. Accordingly, the top left cell in panel (a) gives the 
sample conditional probability Pr (q42a_a_D =1 | q20_d_D =0, union=1) or the probability of a shortfall in 
participation given that management fails to make a sincere effort to involve the employee representation 
agency in solving joint problems and the union entity is the workplace representation type. The variables 
q20_d_D and q42a_a_D are described in Appendix Table 2; they are based on survey questions Q20D and 
Q42a (item A), respectively. q42a_a_D is the outcome variable ER body should be more involved in 
decision making (i.e. a shortfall in desired participation). A similar exercise with identical results was 
conducted using the variables q20_c_D, q42a_c_D, and q44_D. These variables are based on survey 






The Shortfall in Desired Participation Controlling for Variation in the Quality of Industrial Relations, Establishments with a Major HR 
Decision Taken in the Last 12 Months, Marginal Effects 
  Variation in the quality of industrial relations 
Case A 
Management makes sincere efforts  
to involve the employee 
representation 
Case B 
The relationship between 
management and employee 
representation is hostile  
Case C 
 
Management can be trusted  
 
Case D 
Good or very good work climate 


















Type of workplace representation and labor 
organization: 
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Frequency of meetings with management (1-5 ordered 

















Provision of information to the ER body:         
Information provided by management to the ER body is 

















Provision of information to the ER body in the case of  
major HR decisions:         


















The ER body was informed by management and asked to 

















ER influence in the case of major HR decisions:         
The ER body had some or a strong influence on the 



















Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3,272 862 3,783 339 3,248 818 2,622 1,553 
LR test 172.48 11.12 182.55 0.04 171.31 5.96 113.52 37.93 







APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Mapping Formal Workplace Employee Representation to Establishments and Countries 
 





Conseil d’entreprises, Comité pour la prevention et de la 
protection au travail (121, 122, 151, 152) 
2 Bulgaria   
Синдикална организация 
(2611) 
Представители на работниците и служителите~ 
(2641) 
3 Czech Republic  
Odborová organizasse 
(211) 
Rada zaměstnanců  
(221) 
4 Denmark   
Tillidsrepræsentant 
(311) 
 Samarbejdsudvalg  
(321) 
5 Germany  




6 Estonia  




7 Ireland   
Workplace trade union 
representative (911) 
Statutory employee representative, Joint consultative committee 
(921, 931) 





 9 Spain  
 
Sección syndical  
(711, 712) 
Comité de empresa  
(721, 722) 
10 France   
Délégué syndical 
(811) 






Radnicko vijece  
(2721) 




Rappresentanza sindacale unitária (RSU) 
(1021) 
13 Cyprus  
Συνδικαλιστική Εκπροσώπηση 
(1111) 
No works council-type representation 
14 Latvia  
Arodbiedrības 
(1211, 1212) 
Darbinieku pilnvarotie pārstāvji  
(1241, 1242) 
15 Lituania   
Profesinė sąjunga 
(1311) 
Darbo taryba  
(1321) 
16 Luxembourg   
No trade union representation Comité mixte, Délégation du personnel  
(1422, 1423, 1452, 1453) 
17 Hungary  
Szakszervezet (bizalmi) 
(1511) 
Üzemi tanács, Üzemi megbízott 
(1521, 1551) 
18 Malta  
Shop steward (recognized union 
representative) (1611, 1612) 
No works council-type representation 
19 Netherlands  
 
No trade union representation Ondernemingsraad, Personeelsvertegenwoordiging 
(1721, 1751) 
20 Austria  
No trade union representation Betriebsrat  
(1821) 
21 Poland  
 Zakladowa organizacja 
zwiazkowa (1911) 
Rada pracowników  
(1921) 
22 Portugal  
Comissão sindical, Comissão 
intersindical (2011) 
Comissão de trabalhadores  
(2021) 
23 Romania  
Sindicat 
(2811) 
Reprezentanţii salariaţilor  
(2851) 
24 Slovenia   
Sindikalni zaupnik 
(2111) 




25 Slovakia   
Odborová organizácia 
(2211) 
Zamestnaneckárada, Zamestnanecky dôvernik  
(2221, 2241) 
26 Finland   
Ammattiosasto 
(2311) 
YT-toimikunta, Henkilöstön edustaja  
(2321, 2351) 
27 Sweden   
Facklig förtroendeman 
(2411) 
No works council representation 
28 United 
Kingdom   
Recognised shopfloor trade union 
representation (2511) 
Joint consultative committee 
(2531) 
Notes: The mapping is based on the raw ER Questionnaire variable er_type_er. The corresponding code 
indicates the type of workplace employee representation agency to which the respondent belongs. See text 
and Appendix Table 2. 












APPENDIX TABLE 2 











Shortfall in workplace representation:    
ER body should be more involved in 
decision making 
q42a_a 71 1/0 dummy: 1 if ER body should be more involved in decision making (strongly agrees/agrees) 





Establishment union density q4_rec 47 Union density at the establishment  
Employee representative is elected q7 82 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER interviewee was elected, 0 if appointed 
Works council  54 1/0 dummy: 1 if the respondent (i.e. the ER interviewee) is from the works council; 0 if the respondent is 
from the union. Note that if there is a unique works council (union) agency at the workplace, then the 
respondent is necessarily from the works council (union). If the works council and the union agencies 
coexist at the workplace and the employee representative respondent is from the works council (union), 
then the works council (union) is adjudged to be more influential and correspondingly the works council 
(union) status is allocated. This interpretation is based on the fact that the interviews are always conducted 
with the “highest-ranking employee representative of the workplace employee representation body that 
represents the highest proportion of employees at the establishment.” 





Trained employee representative q14 46 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER representative has received training related to his/her role in the last 12 months 
Time allocated to employee representation 
is sufficient 
 88 1/0 dummy: 1 if time allocated to employee representation is sufficient (i.e. either the ER representative 
has some number of hours per week that he/she considers sufficient or he/she can use as much time as is 
necessary or he/she is a full-time employee representative. This variable is generated using the raw 
variables q11 to q13. 
Frequency of meetings with Management q19 
 
 
2.5 The variable indicates how often the ER body meets with management: 1 if meetings with management 
are at least once a week; 2 if at least once a month; 3 if at least once every quarter; 4 if at least once a 
year; 5 if less than once a year. 




In the last 12 months, has management provided the ER-body with any information on the following 
issues? 
Information provided by management to 
the ER body is satisfactory 
q21 and 
q25 
78 1/0 dummy: 1 if the information provided by management in the last 12 months to the ER body was in 
general satisfactory; 0 if management provided the ER body no information at all or it was considered 
unsatisfactory.  
The assessment by the employee representative is based on the information provided on the following 
issues: The financial situation of the establishment; The employment situation of the establishment; The 
introduction of new or significantly changed products or services in the establishment (new); The 
introduction of new or significantly changed processes to produce goods or provide services in the 
42 
 
establishment; Strategic plans with regard to the establishment (e.g. business targets, plans for 
investments and plans to expand activities).  
The variable is generated using the raw variables q21 and q25. The corresponding Stata coding is 
available upon request. 
Assessment of employees’ and management 
attitude: 
   
Employees value the work of the employee 
representation 
q20_a_D 86 1/0 dummy: 1 if employees value the work of the employee representation (strongly agrees or agrees) 
Employees rarely express interest in the 
outcome of consultations or negotiations 
q20_b_D 37 1/0 dummy: 1 if employees rarely express interest in the outcome of consultations or negotiations 
(strongly agrees or agrees) 
The relationship between management and 
employee representation is hostile 
q20_c_D 8 1/0 dummy: 1 if the relationship between management and employee representation can best be 
described as hostile (strongly agrees or agrees) 
Management makes sincere efforts to 
involve the employee representation  
q20_d_D 80 1/0 dummy: 1 if management makes sincere efforts to involve the employee representation in the 
solving of joint problems (strongly agrees or agrees) 
Management can be trusted q42a_c_D 82 1/0 dummy: 1 if management can be trusted (strongly agrees/agrees) 
Good or very good work climate at the 
establishment 
q44_D 64 1/0 dummy: 1 if  the current general work climate in this establishment is very good or good 
Sample: Establishments in which a 
major HR decision has been taken in the 
last 12 months 
q27 
 
This sample comprises all the establishments for which we have the variable major decision=1. This 1/0 
dummy is defined as 1 if any major decision has been taken in the last 12 months, 0 otherwise. The 
interviewee was asked whether in the last 12 months any major decisions (i.e. decisions that affect the 
entire establishment or a large part of it) were taken by the management in the following areas: 
organization of work processes; recruitment and dismissals; occupational health and safety; training and 
career development; working time arrangements; and restructuring measures 




q28_c    
 
The ER body was not informed by 
management 
 14 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER body was not informed by management, not asked to give their views ahead of 
the decision nor involved in joint decision making with management. 
The ER body was only informed by 
management  
 19 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER body was informed by management, but not asked to give their views ahead of 
the decision nor involved in joint decision making with management. 
The ER body was informed by management 
and asked to give their views or involved in 
joint decision  
 67 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER body was informed by management and asked to give their views ahead of the 
decision or involved in joint decision making with management. 
Influence in major decisions:    
The ER body had some or strong influence 
on the decision making 
q38 69 1/0 dummy: 1 if the ER body had some or a strong influence on the management decision. 
Notes: The sample is restricted to establishments with a formal employee workplace representation in 28 European countries. The Online Appendix 
provides the full list of countries and the text defines formal representation at the workplace. The sample includes a maximum of 6,429 observations, 
76% of which had taken a major HR decision taken in the last 12 months. The variables for the subset of establishments with a major decision are 
based on questions 26 to 41; and the corresponding coding for the generated variables is available upon request. 
Source: The 2013 ECS survey, Employee Representative (ER) Questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 
Country Subsets by Workplace Representation Type 
   
Country subsets 
S1: 








Countries with dual systems but 
in which works council-type 
representation is found in more 
than 70% of the cases (‘works 
councils rule’) 
S4: 
Countries with dual systems 
but in which union-type 
representation is found in 
more than 70% of the cases 
(‘unions rule’) 
Countries Germany, Austria, 
Netherlands and 
Luxembourg 
Sweden, Cyprus, and 
Malta 
Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, 
Italy, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Finland 
 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Spain, Greece, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, and the 
United Kingdom 
Variable: Mean incidence of formal 
workplace representation (in 
percent) 
55 43 60 35 
Variable: Mean shortfall in 
participation/involvement in 
decision making (in percent) 
63 79 66 76 
Notes: For a given country mean incidence is defined as the share of establishments with a formal workplace representation in the entire set of 
establishments. The mean shortfall in worker participation is given by the share of establishments in which greater involvement of the ER body is 
desired (strongly or very strongly). The reported means are computed as means of means and were obtained using the 2013 Management and 







APPENDIX TABLE 4 
How Employees Value the Work of the Employee Representation, Their Interest in the Outcome of Consultations or Negotiations, and 
the Shortfall in Workplace Representation (percent) 
 Employees Do Not value the work of the employee representation 
(q20_a_D = 0) 
Employees Value the work of the employee representation 
(q20_a_D = 1) 
Employees rarely express interest 
in the outcome of consultations or 
negotiations? 
NO (q20_b_D = 0) 
Employees rarely express 
interest in the outcome of 
consultations or negotiations? 
YES (q20_b_D = 1) 
Employees rarely express 
interest in the outcome of 
consultations or negotiations? 
NO (q20_b_D = 0) 
Employees rarely express 
interest in the outcome of 
consultations or negotiations? 
YES (q20_b _D= 1) 
Percentage of cases in which the 
respondent agrees or strongly agrees 
that the ER body should be more 














Notes: The variables q20_a_D, q20_b_D, and q42a_a_D are described in Appendix Table 1; they are based on survey questions Q20A, Q20B, and 
Q42a (item A), respectively. The sample is comprised of all establishments with a major HR decision taken in the last 12 months. 





APPENDIX TABLE 5 
Replication of Table 3 Using Alternative Country Subsets, Marginal Effects 
 Case 1 







S1_1 and S3_1 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 






   


































ER resources and functioning:        
0.0834*** 
(0.0307) 

















































Frequency of meetings with management (1-5 ordered 

















Provision of information to the ER body:        
-.1899*** 
(.0358) 
Information provided by management to the ER body is 

















         












Provision of information to the ER body in the case of 
major HR decisions:  
(Reference category: The ER body was not informed 
by management.) 
        










The ER body was informed by management and asked to 














ER influence in the case of major HR decisions:         
The ER body had some or a strong influence on the 









Industry dummies  Yes        
Establishment size dummies Yes        
Number of observations 2,121 1,724 1,299 1,042 1,604 1,127 2,064 1,562 
LR test 99.35 83.57 22.35 21.44 52.39 37.52 46.01 42.72 
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Country subsets classification follows van den Berg et al. (2013). Country subsets: S1_1/Germanic cluster (Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands); S2_1/Scandinavian cluster (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden); S3_1/French cluster (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece); S4_1/Anglo-Saxon cluster (Ireland and the United Kingdom); and S5_1/Transition cluster (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Malta, Cyprus and Croatia are not included in any of these 
five subsets.  
 
